

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-13

OIC-04 AEC-11 CU-04 RSR-01 /155 W

----- 065925

P R 121642Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6244

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 09949

SHAPE FOR INTAF; HELSINKI FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: USNATO 3266

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BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE OFFERS SOME EMBASSY COMMENTS ON USNATO PAPER CONCERNING AN ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS (REFTEL). WE SHARE MISSION'S JUDGMENT THAT NATO SHOULD TURN NOW TO INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION RATHER THAN RETURN TO MBFR GUIDELINES PAPER. WE ALSO AGREE THAT INITIAL WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT FRG AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION WOULD LIKELY BE CONDITIONED, AT THE VERY LEAST, ON OBTAINING A NATO COMMITMENT IN CONFIDENTIAL GUIDELINES PAPER THAT INDIGENOUS FORCES WOULD BE TREATED IN SOME MANNER IN MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS--IF ONLY BY PUBLICLY USEABLE DECLARATION--TO TRY FOR INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS IN MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS; AND FRG IS LIKELY AT THIS TIME TO TAKE A STIFFER POSITION ON INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER INITIAL WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD NOT REQUIRE ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS, AS IN US OPTION I, WITH US OPTION II HELD BACK AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE POSITION. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE IS A STRONG FEELING IN BONN THAT THE RELATIVELY SHORT TIME PRECEDING OCTOBER 30 REQUIRES THE ALLIANCE NOW TO BEGIN TO PUT ITS NEGOTIATING HOUSE IN ORDER TO AVOID ANOTHER EXPERIENCE ALONG THE LINES OF THE HUNGARIAN ONE AT THE VIENNA MIT. WITH CONSIDERABLE ALLIANCE WORK IMPENDING IN PREPARING FOR THE CSCE COMMITTEE PHASE, THE ATLANTIC RELATIONS DIALOGUE AND DEFENSE ISSUES, OUR FRG CONTACTS WOULD AGREE WITH THE USNATO SENSE OF URGENCY IN DEVELOPING A BASIC PAPER, HOPEFULLY BY MID-JULY, SO THAT WORK COULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUMMER BREAK ON AN AGREED ALLIED PAPER CONCERNING ACCEPTABLE FINAL OUTCOME(S) OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

2. THE DEPARTMENT MAY RECALL THAT, IN RESPONDING TO THE APRIL 30 US PAPER, BONN AND OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS STRESSED THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NEGOTIABILITY AS WELL AS WESTERN DESIDERATA IN MBFR; (GERMAN OFFICIALS SECRET

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FAVORED CONSIDERATION OF LIKELY SOVIET VIEWS). IN THIS SENSE, THE USNATO EMPHASIS ON AN INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION RATHER THAN CONCEPTUAL GUIDELINES WILL BE WELCOMED HERE. THE FRG AGREES ON THE UNDESIRABILITY OF REPEATING THE FRUSTRATING GAP EXERCISE OF LAST NOVEMBER/DECEMBER AND THIS SPRING'S INCONCLUSIVE DEBATE ON MBFR GUIDELINES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE BELIEVE THE FRG MAY BE INCLINED TO USE THE VEHICLE OF THE STILL INCOMPLETE

GUIDELINES PAPER IN AN EFFORT TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS ON KEY QUESTIONS WHICH ARE TAKEN UP EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY IN THE WESTERN INITIAL NEGOTIATION POSITION PAPER. THIS LATTER TACK COULD EMERGE PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE CHOICE OF THE BASIC NEGOTIATION OPTION AS WELL AS REGARDING THE PERENNIALY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF STATIONED/INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS.

3. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (BONN 8785--LIMDIS), THE FRG CABINET HAS EXPRESSED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR US OPTION I; THIS POSITION HAS THE EXPRESSED SUPPORT OF CHANCELLOR BRANDT, FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER, CHANCELLERY MINISTER BAHR, AND THE

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USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 09949

INFLUENTIAL FINANCE (AND FORMER DEFENSE) MINISTER
SCHMIDT. AS THE GERMANS SEE IT, US OPTION I EMBODIES
GERMAN MBFR THEOLOGY ON THE PHASED APPROACH AND ALSO
ENTAILS REDUCTIONS IN BUNDESWEHR FORCES. OPTION I ALSO
ENTAILS ASYMMETRICAL FORCE CUTS TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF
THE USSR, SOMETHING THE FRG AS WELL AS THE US HAS
FAVORED. WHATEVER THE CONTENT OF THE INITIAL NEGOTIAT-
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ING POSITION TABLED BY THE WEST, WE WOULD EXPECT THE
GERMANS TO INSIST STRONGLY ON AN INTERNAL ALLIED POSI-
TION FAVORING OPTION I.

4. AS THE DEPARTMENT KNOWS, THE STATIONED/INDIGENOUS
REDUCTION ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED DEFINITELY
IN THIS CAPITAL; AS THINGS PRESENTLY STAND, SUPPORTERS
OF EARLY INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS STILL HOLD THE UPPER
HAND. THE FRG MIGHT COME TO ACCEPT SOME COMPROMISE ON
THIS ISSUE, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF VAN DER STOEL'S
PROPOSAL AT COPENHAGEN. AS REPORTED (BONN 9440 AND
9568--BOTH LIMDIS), WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME RECEP-
TIVITY TO THE ARGUMENT THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE WESTERN
INTEREST TO HOLD BACK THE PROSPECT OF BUNDESWEHR CUTS
IN EARLY PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, USING THIS PROSPECT
AS A CARROT IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY SOVIET DEMANDS FOR
BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS. BUT SHOULD THE FRG EVENTUALLY
AGREE TO THIS NEGOTIATION TACTIC, WHICH STILL IS BY NO
MEANS CERTAIN, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE GERMANS WOULD SEEK
SOME TYPE OF CONCRETE ALLIED COMMITMENT, PERHAPS IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL GUIDELINES PAPER, TO THE EFFECT THAT INDI-
GENOUS FORCES WOULD BE TREATED IN SOME MANNER IN THE
MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS. THIS APPROACH WOULD SEEM TO BE IN
OUR INTERESTS, VIS-A-VIS BONN AS WELL AS MOSCOW, AS IT
WOULD PERMIT US, DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS
OF THE MBFR-I NEGOTIATIONS, TO ARGUE TOWARD THEIR END
PHASE FOR EITHER MORE SPECIFIC OR MORE GENERAL "TREAT-
MENT OF INDIGENOUS FORCES".

5. WE AGREE WITH USNATO THAT INITIAL MBFR REDUCTIONS
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES AS THIS WOULD
BE THE MOST HELPFUL RESULT IN TERMS OF BOTH OUR REQUIRE-
MENTS VIS-A-VIS THE CONGRESS AND OUR WISH TO MAXIMIZE

REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET VIS-A-VIS EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES. BUT, IN ADDITION TO THE LIKELY STRONG GERMAN INSISTENCE ON US OPTION I FOR THE REASONS INDICATED ABOVE, THERE WOULD ALSO APPEAR TO BE GOOD TACTICAL REASONS FOR CONSIDERING PROPOSING ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS (ALONG THE LINES OF OPTION I) IN OUR INITIAL NEGOTIATION PROPOSALS. GIVEN THE BROAD PUBLICITY ON THE DROPPING OF THE "B" FROM MBFR, THIS APPROACH COULD HELP ASSURE OUR SECRET

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ALLIES, AS WELL AS PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINIONS. IT ALSO WOULD IN NO WAY PRECLUDE A CHANGE AT A LATER POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE US OPTION II APPROACH OF PARITY VIA ONE-SIXTH REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, IF SUCH A CHANGE THEN SEEMED TO BE IN OUR INTERESTS. AN INITIAL WESTERN READINESS TO ACCEPT SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, HOWEVER, COULD EFFECTIVELY ESTOP US FROM LATER DEMANDING ASSYMMETRICAL SOVIET CUTS. THAT SCENARIO WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IF BOTH SOVIET AND ALLIED PRESSURE FOR INDIGENOUS REDUCTIONS BECOMES URGENT. WE COULD THEN BE LEFT WITHOUT ASSYMMETRICAL SOVIET CUTS IN RETURN FOR BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS.

6. DESPITE BONN'S PREFERENCE FOR POSTPONING THE ACTUAL TABLING OF THE INITIAL WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION UNTIL NEXT SPRING, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT GERMANY WILL GO ALONG WITH TABLING THE INITIAL WESTERN POSITION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, SHOULD THE US CONSIDER THAT TO BE APPROPRIATE.

7. THE GERMANS AS WELL AS OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO BEEF UP THE INITIAL NEGOTIATION POSITION TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH CONSTRAINTS AND PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THESE PROPOSED MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO GO BEYOND NONCIRCUMVENTION IN HUNGARY, AS THEY REPRESENT A MAJOR COMPONENT OF GERMAN MBFR POLICY.

8. FINALLY, THE FRG WILL CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZE HOW US PROPOSALS BEAR ON THE ALWAYS SENSITIVE QUESTION OF AREA(S) FOR REDUCTIONS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES. BONN PROBABLY WILL SEEK TO KEEP THE CONSTRAINTS AREA ISSUE OPEN BY SAYING IT SHOULD DEPEND ON THE PRECISE NATURE OF EVENTUAL MBFR AGREEMENT(S). BUT BONN WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS. HILLENBRAND

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 JUL 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BONN09949
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS HILLENBRAND
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730739/aaaabcfr.tel
Line Count: 272
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 73 NATO BRUSSELS 3266
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <10-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: PARM, GE, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005